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Abstract  
 
An in-depth analysis of eleven cases is used to provide insight into the neglected area of the 
dynamics of boards in academic spin-offs. Drawing on stage-based, resource dependence and 
social network theories, we explore board formation and changes in board composition 
occurring in Norwegian and US spin-offs. We find that these theories are important 
complements to earlier research on boards in technology-based new ventures. The process of 
board formation is mainly driven by social networks of the founders. Although we find 
differences in the initial board compositions in Norwegian and US spin-offs, there is 
convergence over time in subsequent board changes, which are mainly driven by the social 
networks of the board chair. Additions of key board members are associated with the progress 
of a spin-off developing from one stage to another. Several avenues for future research and 
implications are discussed. 
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Introduction  
Earlier board studies have mainly investigated mature firms, using samples from large US 
firms, agency theory and multivariate analyses of secondary data (Lynall et al., 2003; Huse 
2007).  Research into boards in small and entrepreneurial firms has focused on boards as a 
means by which new firms can manage external dependency (Selznick 1949; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978; Borch and Huse 1993; George et al. 2001). Venture capital (VC) involvement 
in boards of small firms has also been studied (Rosenstein 1988; Fried et al. 1998; Deakins et 
al. 2000; Sapienza et al. 2000). More recent research incorporates social exchange, identity, 
social networks, organizational justice, game and other theories to improve our understanding 
of corporate governance in private firms (Uhlaner et al. 2007). 
 
Still, little attention has been devoted to the board of directors in academic spin-off companies 
(ASOs). ASOs are usually based on technology formally transferred from the parent 
organization, which is a public research organization such as a university or research institute. 
Boards in ASOs are particularly interesting to study since ASOs are new ventures in 
transition, which go through a number of stages of activity and need to develop resources and 
capabilities (Vohora et al. 2004) and board structure and processes (Filatotchev et al. 2006) to 
enable their transition from a non-commercial environment to the market. 
 
Once resource needs have been determined and a team has been selected, it will usually be 
necessary to obtain additional resources from outside the venture in the startup stage 
(Timmons and Spinelli 2004). Scientist-entrepreneurs may attract experienced and well-
connected directors to their boards who can play an important role in accessing critical 
external resources (Lynall et al. 2003). However, finding appropriate board members is a 
challenge for scientist-entrepreneurs with networks limited to peers within academia (Cooper 
and Daily 1997; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Mosey and Wright 2007). In addition, to move 
an ASO forward to the next development stage, the new configurations of resources and 
capabilities should be obtained. This can be done by attracting new external directors 
providing access to new resources. Thus, one might expect that different board members are 
needed on the board in different stages. The board composition may thus change reflecting the 
firm’s life cycle (Lynall et al. 2003).   
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Few studies, however, look explicitly at the boards in ASOs. Clarysse et al. (2007) have 
provided quantitative evidence on board composition in ASOs. They found that high-tech 
start-ups, with a public research organization as an external equity stakeholder, are more 
likely to include outside board members with complementary skills to the founding team than 
ASOs with venture capitalists or founders as the main stakeholders. Filatotchev et al. (2006) 
have provided evidence of 27 ASOs from UK universities as ventures facing a founder-
manager/IPO (initial public offering) threshold, which requires access to external resources 
and expertise. Vanaelst et al. (2006) studied the entrepreneurial team development in ten 
Belgian ASOs. They showed that after legal establishment of the venture the founding team 
evolves into two other teams: the management team and the board. However, their focus was 
on the founding and management team. Showing that the boards in ASOs may change, these 
studies emphasize the need for more in-depth research on changes in board composition in the 
firm’s lifecycle.  Yet, the majority of board studies has taken a snapshot of the board 
composition at a certain point, and linked it to performance. 
 
Responding to these calls for a closer investigation into board dynamics, the purpose of this 
study is, therefore, to explore how boards are formed and how boards evolve through various 
stages of a spin-off process. We address this research gap by investigating (1) Which board 
members do ASOs add, and why, in the start-up stage?  (2) When, why and how do the main 
changes in board composition occur during subsequent stages? 
 
Thus, our paper extends previous research and makes a number of contributions. First, it 
studies boards in early stage Norwegian and US spin-offs, rarely addressed by governance 
studies which mainly focused on mature firms employing cross-sectional data and treating the 
board as a static concept (Gabrielsson and Huse 2004). Given limited prior research on board 
evolution we use inductive logic and in-depth cases (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 
1989). Second, it responds to recent suggestions in governance literature to use other theories 
than agency theory (Huse 2007). Specifically, we combine life cycle, resource dependence 
and social network theories and find that these theories are important complements to research 
on boards in new ventures. Third, it focuses explicitly on changes in the boards of ASOs. 
Accordingly, the paper adds to academic entrepreneurship research by linking board changes 
to development stages (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006) and dominant tasks 
(Kazanjan 1988) and suggesting that board changes are associated with the progress to the 
next stage with outside directors contributing to overcoming critical junctures.  
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Below, we start by outlining our framework based on stage-based, resource dependence, and 
social networks theories. Next, we discuss the research design and data collection methods, 
followed by a presentation of the findings and a development of propositions. Finally, we 
conclude and discuss future research directions and policy implications.  
 
 
Theory 
 
To introduce a dynamic component in spin-off boards we incorporate literature on stages in 
new firm development. In particular, we use stage-of-growth models specifically developed 
for ASOs as high-tech new ventures (Kazanjian 1988; Vohora et al. 2004; Clarysse and 
Moray 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Employing a stage-based and resource-based framework, 
Vohora et al. (2004) identify five stages that ASOs encounter in their development: (1) 
research stage, (2) opportunity framing stage, (3) pre-organization stage, (4) reorientation 
stage, and (5) sustainable returns stage. Furthermore, Vohora et al. (2004) argue that while the 
different stages are important it is the difficulties in moving from stage to stage that create 
critical junctures, which are the key challenges an ASO faces in its development. Critical 
junctures arise because the venture requires new configurations of resources, capabilities and 
networks if it is to progress to the next stage of development. If the critical junctures remain 
unresolved for a prolonged period of time, the venture will eventually fail. Four key critical 
junctures that spin-off companies need to overcome if they are to succeed are (1) opportunity 
recognition, (2) entrepreneurial commitment by a venture champion, (3) attaining credibility 
in the business environment, and (4) achieving sustainable returns within their respective 
markets.  
 
Other researchers (e.g. Kazanjan 1998; Clarysse and Moray, 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006) came 
to a similar classification of stages: a research stage, during which the project prepares itself 
to formally turn into a spin-off, and a post-startup stage, during which external capitalization 
takes place. Each venture must pass through the previous stage in order to progress to the next 
one, but each stage involves an iterative, nonlinear process of development in which there 
may be a need to revisit some of the earlier decisions and activities. In addition, ventures face 
different problems that dominate during different stages. Kazanjan (1998) examined the 
relationship between stages of growth and the dominant tasks and found that in earlier stages 
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the dominant tasks are product and technology development, securing finance and strategic 
positioning in a new product-market segment. In later stages acquisition of additional 
resources, sales and marketing, and organization and administration are the dominant tasks. 
 
The legal incorporation of the company is an important entrepreneurial event marking that the 
company moves from the pre-startup to the post-startup era (Clarysse and Moray 2004). At 
this point in time the founding team evolves into the management team and a board of 
directors (Vanaelst et al. 2006). As shown in the study by Vanaelst et al. (2006) both the 
management team and the board may evolve. However, their focus was on examining changes 
in the founding and management team. We address this gap by focusing on changes in board 
accommodating stage-based aspects while seeking to understand when, why and how the 
changes in board composition occur in the trajectory of an ASO’s development.  
 
ASOs aim at finding appropriate board members to fill the gaps discovered in the process of 
forming the management team in the start-up stage (Timmons and Spinelli 2004; Ucbasaran et 
al. 2003).  During subsequent growth stages the gaps are discovered when difficulties arise 
and ASOs face critical junctures. Such gaps can represent the absence of relevant experience, 
know-how, networks, and other current needs that can be provided by outsiders. We thus 
draw on the resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer 1972; Johnson et al. 1996; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). In this view, the evolution of the board is a response to the changing resource 
needs in the firms. New board members are seen as resource providers playing value-adding 
roles in the ASO’s development (Selznick 1949; Boeker and Goodstein 1991; Deakins et al. 
2000; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Given the limited resource base of a start-up, a board of 
directors is an excellent vehicle for accessing scarce and/or strategic resources (Lynall et al. 
2003). Following the logic of resource dependency, new members will be selected so that 
they bring necessary complementary resources to the firm. The resource dependence theory is 
concerned with reducing uncertainty regarding the flow of capital, information and other 
resources at the lowest cost. Hence, the scientist-entrepreneurs who have best access to 
critical resources that will move the firm forward will not attract new members to the board of 
directors. Instead, they take a place on the board themselves.  
 
In addition, most ventures typically look to personal acquaintances of the lead entrepreneur or 
team for their first outside directors (Timmons and Spinelli 2004). Scientist-entrepreneurs, 
considering starting their own businesses, were shown to develop social networks with TTOs 
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and more experienced academic entrepreneurs (Mosey and Wright 2007). Social network 
literature is thus also relevant to our study (e.g. Granovetter 1985; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), 
dealing with the influence of social networks on board formation and composition. In this 
view, the member addition process is driven by the actors’ social relations and interpersonal 
attraction (Forbes et al., 2006). The implication of social network theory for new member 
addition is that scientist-entrepreneurs are likely to recruit board members from their existing 
social networks (Birley 1985; Larson 1992; Westphal 1999) so that the likelihood of adding 
an outside director similar to the lead entrepreneur or the team is high (McPherson et al. 2001; 
Zahra and Pearce 1989; Ruef et al. 2003). New members will reflect the original founders’ 
social networks with ascribed and achieved characteristics similar to the founders.  
 
Our integrated theoretical framework is depicted in Figure 1.  
_____________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_____________________________ 
 
We expect that during the legal incorporation of the company the board members will reflect 
the existing personal networks of the founding team with characteristics similar to those of the 
founders, but bringing in resources that the founding team does not have. After legal 
incorporation the board may undergo changes as the venture needs to acquire outside 
resources to overcome critical junctures, solving various problems that arise in different 
development stages. The new members recruited in the post-startup stage will to a greater 
extent reflect the social networks of the existing members on board. That is, if the company 
has external stakeholders on the board, the composition of the board will also reflect the 
social networks of the principal stakeholders, such as the CEO and external financiers (Lynall 
et al. 2003). These new members are expected to bring critical resources that the top 
management team lacks, helping ASO to solve current dominant tasks and move it forward. 
Methods and empirical context 
Given limited prior research on the evolution of boards, especially for young ASOs, our 
research design is a multiple case, inductive study (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 
1989). Multiple cases allow replication. In contrast to pooled logic where each observation is 
part of a larger sample, replication logic views multiple cases as a series of experiments, with 
each case confirming or not confirming the inferences drawn from the others (Yin 1994). 
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Single-case studies offer insight into one particular example; multiple cases provide us with 
empirical richness and may also generate generalizeable and accurate theoretical insights 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
Following Eisenhardt (1989), our sample of ASOs was selected to give a substantial degree of 
variance regarding the stage of development, technological focus and institutional 
environments like university origin and VC industry support. This degree of variance is 
important to obtain insights into the process of how board composition changes over time and 
facilitates the investigation of replication across cases. 
 
We have sampled eleven academic spin-off companies that were created to commercialize 
intellectual property (IP) initially generated within parent institutions. In all these companies 
at least one board change occurred. In all cases at least one of the scientist-entrepreneurs was 
still involved as a top manager (CEO, CTO, R&D director, board chair or member) – a person 
who had taken the venture through the founding process and who was aware of the current 
operations of the company. The ASOs come from five different Norwegian research 
institutions and three US universities. All institutions are actively pursuing technology 
transfer through licensing and ASOs. However, these institutions are located in different 
areas, and have a different orientation towards the commercialization of research. This is 
reflected in their cultures, values and institutional norms, seen not least in varying levels of 
public and VC support.  
 
Norway has had a long history of ASOs for over a century. In international investigations, 
Norwegian universities and research institutes report a high number of spin-offs compared to 
many other countries (OECD 2003). However, until recently research results were the 
property of the individual professors. A substantial publicly funded support structure of 
technology transfer offices (TTOs), seed capital funds etc. has been built up following 
legislation in 2003 which was closely modelled after the US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Many 
earlier spin-offs have become support companies for large national industries like oil, gas and 
metal processing, while the VC industry has traditionally been weak. The recent legislative 
changes and strong public role in the commercialization of research may make Norway 
representative of smaller western European countries.  
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Silicon Valley, where four US cases in our sample come from, has had a strong VC industry 
and close informal networks between entrepreneurs (e.g. Saxenian 1994). The difference in 
venture capital between Silicon Valley and Michigan, where two other US cases come from, 
is that over a billion dollars of investments happens in the former region and about 10-20 
millions in Michigan (McCorquodale 2007). Some studies have found that US TTOs are 
relatively more oriented toward patenting and licensing than spin-offs when compared to 
other countries (Arundel & Bordoy 2007; OECD 2003). Thus, ASOs may be seen as fairly 
common in the US and Norway, but the surrounding networks and support structure vary 
widely. 
 
The cases represent different technology platforms covering engineering, biology, chemistry, 
physics, and computer sciences. Each of the ASOs’ core technology (or medicine, drug) is 
characterized as internationally new. All ASOs except spin-off Software have patented their 
core technology in and outside their country. There has been a steady growth in employees in 
all cases. Finally, each case is at a different stage of development, allowing greater insights 
into the evolutionary aspects of board composition. Table 1 gives an overview of the sample 
used in our study. 
_____________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_____________________________ 
 
Biotech spin-offs tend to develop both a board of directors and a scientific advisory board 
(SAB) which is beyond the focus of this study. Only one Norwegian case in our sample had a 
SAB, the four others did not (including another biotech company). All US cases, even the 
four semiconductor companies, had a scientific or technical advisory board. We asked 
whether members of these advisory boards had contributed by helping to find and select new 
board members, and this was not the case. 
 
Data were collected through in-depth face-to-face interviews, followed by telephone 
interviews with representatives from the eleven ASOs from March 2006 to December 2006 in 
Norway and from January 2007 to May 2007 in the US. We collected background material on 
each of the institutions about how they organized their technology transfer activities. From 
this, a list of interviewees was compiled. In most cases we interviewed the current CEO who 
was usually one of the founders, a scientist-entrepreneur or an externally introduced 
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“surrogate” entrepreneur (Franklin et al. 2001). In two cases we interviewed two members of 
the founding team on different occasions. As for Norwegian cases we could trace all board 
changes through the database. This limitation is thus addressed by checking the responses 
against the database and, if needed, asking additional questions after interviews. The original 
founder was an important respondent who knew the inside story of the venture throughout its 
entire life. The founders were targeted because they possessed the most comprehensive 
knowledge about the venture’s history, strategy, processes, and performance (Carter et al., 
1994). Our interviews focused on different founding team and board members, their 
background and expertise, how they got involved in the venture etc. Additional data on the 
venture’s resources, strategies, and industry environment were also gathered during the semi-
structured interviews and follow-up calls. 
 
The eleven companies were between two and nine years old when the interviews were 
conducted. The young age of the companies and the involvement of the original founder in 
strategic decisions like board changes improve the likelihood of informants accurately 
recalling events. All interviews lasted from one to two hours and were recorded and 
transcribed. 
 
Besides interviews, we used several databases that contain accounting data and information 
on the board and top management. For the Norwegian cases we used the national registers, 
Brønnøysundregistrene, the official export and trade directory Nortrade, and the business 
search engine Purehelp. For the US cases we used the Link Silicon Valley directory 
supplemented by other sources, e.g. The San Jose Mercury News and extensive web searches. 
Such triangulation of data improved reliability by providing a check against the inaccuracy of 
informant responses (Yin 1994; Jick 1979). Triangulation was especially helpful in the cases 
where the informants in the older ASOs had difficulties recalling the date of events or names.  
In addition, we assured anonymity for companies and informants. Collectively, this 
combination improved the likelihood that the methods yield rich, detailed, and accurate 
accounts. 
 
Responses from the interviews and additional information were used to develop a case study 
database, which included table shells to record data (Miles and Huberman 1994). These table 
outlines ensured that data collection focused on the research questions and verified that the 
same information was collected for all cases. The individual case histories ranged between 10 
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and 20 pages, including interview quotes, summary tables, and charts of key facts. For each 
case we also used a retrospective reconstruction of the early growth stage. Within-case 
analysis concentrated on developing generalizeable and unique patterns that emerged for each 
firm, and proceeded in an iterative fashion with data collection to provide better grounding 
and improve the conceptual insights. Once the individual case studies were complete, we used 
cross-case analysis, relying on methods suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) to develop common and differential factors. Conceptual insights 
concerning boards in ASOs were drawn out and refined during an iterative process as the case 
studies progressed. This iteration between theory and data helped to sharpen constructs, 
strengthen the internal validity of findings, and raise the generalizability of results. 
 
Findings and development of propositions 
As suggested by Vanaelst et al. (2006) pre-startup teams (before legal incorporation) differ 
from post-startup teams. This difference may have consequences for who is added to the 
board of directors. Pre-startup founding teams choose their first top management team (TMT) 
and board members during legal incorporation relying on their personal networks and 
estimates of additional resources they need to obtain from outside members. After legal 
incorporation, both post-startup team and board of directors may be involved in decisions 
about board additions. Hence, in the discussion we differentiate between initial board 
composition, which is the result of board formation process in the start-up stage, and changes 
in board composition in the post-startup stages (depicted in Figure 1). A detailed description 
of the initial board composition, first change in board and other findings can be found in 
Table 2. 
_____________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_____________________________ 
 
Who is added and why in the start-up stage 
During the legal startup of the companies the founding teams consisted either solely of 
scientists or scientists and “privileged witnesses” (Vanaelst et al. 2006). Privileged witnesses 
are the advisors that guide the researchers in the pre-startup stages and with whom the 
researchers develop close relationships (ibid.). In our sample most of the privileged witnesses 
were part of the university community, e.g. TTO and incubator representatives, current and 
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former MBA students, and industrial partners who carried out the research together with 
scientist-entrepreneurs. Our small data set indicates a difference between the US and the 
Norwegian cases. In the latter, the privileged witnesses came mainly from the TTOs, while in 
the US cases the privileged witnesses represented local seed funds at the university incubators 
and small VCs. Similar to the findings of Vanaelst et al. (2006) for Belgium, our results seem 
to confirm the universities’ active role as stakeholders in the development of ASOs in 
Norway. For the US, our data support other studies (e.g. Arundel & Bordoy 2007; OECD 
2003) indicating that TTO assistance seems to be concentrated on developing patenting and 
licence agreements. However, further investigations are needed to compare countries, a task, 
which is complicated further by large differences between universities. 
 
The advisory role of the privileged witnesses became formalized with the establishment of the 
board. Privileged witnesses took a seat on the board and together with scientist-entrepreneurs 
formally committed to the spin-off in almost all cases.  In the case of Nutriment the TTO 
director appointed two members from his personal network, instead of taking a seat on the 
board himself. Only one ASO SemiCon1 formed a board which included outside members 
with whom the founders neither had previous relationships nor knew through personal 
acquaintances. This may be due to winning the first prize in the business plan competition at 
Stanford. As the founder stated, “After we won the business plan competition there we a lot of 
interest from the investors… we could pick those with experience in semiconductors…and 
network relevant to what we were trying to do”. 
 
These findings spur reflections on social networks and resource dependency. Entrepreneurs 
do look to personal acquaintances of the lead entrepreneur or team for their first board 
members. The process of board formation is mainly driven by the social networks of the 
founders. Putting it another way, during the pre-startup stages the founders have developed 
professional relationships with privileged witnesses who guided the founders from the 
research stage untill the venture was legally incorporated. Interaction with privileged 
witnesses turned them into “trusted informants” (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). These social 
relations between the scientists and privileged witnesses were thus primary predictors of 
initial board composition, as social network theory implies. Hence, 
 
Proposition 1: The board at founding will most likely consist of the scientist-entrepreneurs 
and people from the scientist-entrepreneurs’ networks. 
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When do the main board changes occur during subsequent growth stages? 
Nine out of eleven cases in our sample have overcome the credibility threshold around and 
during first change in the board thus reaching the next Re-orientation or Proof of Viability 
stage. Following Vanaelst et al. (2006) Proof of Viability post-startup stage was characterized 
by proving the viability of the newly established venture and by the team bringing together 
necessary resources to develop it. Entrepreneurs in this stage had gained access to and 
acquired an initial stock of financial, human and physical resources, which were required for 
the business to begin to function. The credibility threshold refers to a lack of credibility that 
constrains the entrepreneur’s ability to access and acquire key resources: seed finance and 
human capital to form the entrepreneurial team (Vohora et al. 2004). Two cases that did not 
overcome the credibility threshold during first change were the ones that had experienced the 
influence of external factors - restructuring of the TTO and partner’s organizations involved 
in these ASOs through the board. This suggests that well-advised and deliberate board 
changes - as opposed to externally induced changes due to outside or unforeseen events - 
contribute to overcoming the threshold of credibility and taking the venture to the next stage. 
 
The only spin-off that seemed to have become sustainable and reached Sustainable returns or 
Maturity stage during the second change in board composition was Biotech1. This is most 
probably due to extremely large investments since the firm’s inception. Maturity stage means 
that the venture had proven viability, and founders had built up credibility outside the 
scientific community and attracted additional resources. SemiCon2 seems to have reached the 
Maturity stage around the third change in board composition after the second round of fund 
raising and selection of a manufacturing partner.  Biomedical and Biotech2, the oldest cases 
in the sample, seem to have reached Maturity stage during the fourth change in board. For 
them overcoming the sustainability threshold meant going public.  
 
SemiCon1, SemiCon3 and SemiCon4 reported to be in the transition stage of overcoming the 
sustainability threshold and reaching the Maturity stage. These respondents emphasized the 
iterative, nonlinear nature of the development process. For instance, the founders in 
SemiCon1 were close to reaching the Maturity stage, but realized that the deficiency in 
management hindered them “to raise revenues and develop technology as fast as we 
[founders] could”. So, SemiCon1 decided to replace the old CEO with a new one.  
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An interesting aspect of development stages in our cases is that many of the Norwegian ASOs 
mentioned that the first change in board was associated with “the actual start-up” of the 
company and overcoming the credibility threshold. Before this critical point, the companies 
had spent more time than planned on attracting investors, and the interviewees were 
disappointed with the TTOs in not being able to speed up the process. “Actual start-up” was 
in all cases related to finding “the right individual with the right [investor] contacts and large 
[industrial] networks”. None of the US spinoffs described the first change in board 
composition in terms of an actual start-up. 
 
It may be added that we have observed nine founder and four outside member departures from 
the board during the first three changes compared to 20 outside member additions during just 
the first change. The effect of these departures on ASO development was unclear. The 
scientist-entrepreneurs left their firms for several reasons: they saw a better opportunity to 
pursue or they wanted to return to university. The reason for founder departure was often 
related to board representation when venture capitalists or independent outsiders came on 
board. In this case, the scientist-entrepreneur took a senior management position on the TMT 
or moved to the SAB. 
 
Overall, our findings indicate that after legal incorporation the additions of the key board 
members (e.g. board chair, investor) are associated with the progress of a spin-off from one 
stage to another or at least they make the venture approach closer to the next stage. That is, 
the additions were associated with reaching entrepreneurial milestones, e.g. getting external 
capital, proving or sampling the product, finalizing deals with collaboration partners, finding 
new distributors, expanding to other markets, which all moved the venture forward. Hence,  
 
Proposition 2a: The board composition will change as the academic spin-off grows.  
 
Proposition 2b: The first change in board composition will most likely be positively related 
to gaining credibility and moving to the Proof of Viability stage.   
 
Proposition 2c: Subsequent changes in board composition will most likely move the 
academic spin-off closer towards the Maturity stage.      
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Why does the board change after the company’s legal incorporation? 
After legal incorporation and formation of the initial TMT and board, the scientist-
entrepreneurs in our cases tried to recruit key individuals outside the academic community. 
The initial resources of ASOs were limited to intangible resources, comprising of mainly 
technological assets and related know-how within a set of patents. The first boards had a 
limited set of complementary resources they could provide. However, the further ASO 
development required some initial financial investments or the co-optation of resources (Starr 
and MacMillan 1990) through existing relationships and external networks (Aldrich and 
Zimmer 1986). Hence, ASOs searched for new board members who would procure critical 
resources like seed or VC finance, market and industry knowledge, and management skills. 
Achieving this commitment relied heavily upon the level of social capital the scientist-
entrepreneurs were able to leverage through their personal contacts or those of initial board 
members.  
 
For all cases raising sufficient seed or venture capital was a key activity along with 
technology/drug development, like as in earlier investigations (Kazanjian 1988; Vohora et al. 
2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). This was critical for acquiring other necessary resources to 
develop an embryonic ASO venture into a fully operational business to be able to engage in 
productive activities.  Hence, finance was the main resource obtained through new board 
members who were all outsiders and mostly investors (see Table 2 column 6). Prior industry 
experience, including networks and specific knowledge, were the second most reported 
resources obtained through new members. Finally, the competence “around the company” 
such as IP issues, legal advice and executive experience, which does not reside in the post-
startup TMT was the third main resource obtained.  
 
TTOs in Norway emphasize the importance of having people with start-up experience on the 
board. Surprisingly, prior start-up experience of board members was not among the first 
resources the board members were valued for, although several new members had started 
companies before. This may be due to VC funding being more likely for high quality teams 
(Baum and Silverman 2004; Florin 2005). This suggests that the ability to acquire financial 
resources or industry-specific knowledge, developed during a previous start-up attempt, may 
be more valuable than the prior start-up experience itself.  
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During the second change there were fifteen member additions in nine cases. In seven cases 
the new members were outsiders: either VCs or from industry. During next third change the 
new members added were again outsiders: seven investors, two from industry, and two CEOs. 
Few, the oldest cases, have had the fourth board change. There were strategic, resource-
related, considerations in the decisions to add members to the board in all cases except for 
spin-offs Chemical and Optical. Here, the reason for the board changes was the re-structuring 
of other companies that were represented on the board of Optical and Chemical. These 
members were simply replaced by new representatives. 
 
Thus, the board members added in the first rounds (during first and second changes) were 
mostly investors and people who could contribute with industry-specific networks and 
knowledge. The resources and capabilities obtained through these members were 
complementary to those of the TMT, which concentrated on mainly solving the development 
of technology/product task.   
 
During the third and subsequent board changes the new members were investors, professional 
executives and those who “knew the markets” in which customers and potential collaboration 
partners operated. However, people responsible for the company’s financial system and sales 
and marketing were appointed to the TMT indicating a shift in the TMT’s focus from 
product/technology development to internal efficiencies (Kazanjan 1988). Thus, new board 
members helped the TMT with such tasks as acquisition of other resources, organization and 
administration, and sales and marketing. In eight cases the CEO was replaced by a new one 
with much executive experience indicating the need for more formalized organizational and 
administrative skills and routines. In seven of these cases the external professional CEO was 
hired to replace scientist-entrepreneurs, TTO and university seed fund representatives who 
were functioning as CEOs in the firm.  Hence, as the resource dependence theory predicts, the 
boards increasingly consisted of members who could add value to the firm by bringing in 
different resources that the TMT needed depending on the current dominant task the ASO 
worked on. Thus, 
 
Proposition 3a: New board members will most likely bring critical resources that the top 
management team lacks, depending on the current dominant tasks. 
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Proposition 3b: New board members’ resources will most likely range from finance and 
industry experience in earlier stages to executive and market/sales experience in later stages. 
 
How are board members added? 
While attempting reaching the Proof of Viability stage the new board members were brought 
to the board through personal contacts of privileged witnesses, scientist-entrepreneurs and 
board chair in eight cases and of new CEO and investors in three cases (see Table 2 column 6 
and 8). Surprisingly, in seven cases an outsider who entered during first board change became 
chair and stayed with the ASO until the time we finished all our interviews (Table 2 column 
7). This had consequences for subsequent changes: the common denominator for these cases 
was that the new members were added to the board primarily through the networks of this 
board chair. As the new chair was an investor and/or person with 15 to 40 years of working 
experience in industry, the new members attracted to the board in subsequent rounds had 
similar backgrounds, comprising finance, executive and/or industry experience. Hence, the 
board composition from the second change reflected to a greater extent the social networks of 
the board chair as social network theory predicts. 
 
During the second change in six out of seven cases the new members were also added through 
the new chair. Nine cases in our sample had experienced a third change in board with the 
same pattern in terms of social networks as previous change. Again, outsiders were added 
through the chair’s network in eight cases. Few of our cases have experienced a fourth change 
so it is hard to infer firm conclusions from this; but the pattern was similar to the second and 
third board changes in terms of social networks.  
 
Besides, we expected that if the company had external stakeholders on the board, the 
composition of the board after legal start-up would also reflect the social networks of the 
principal stakeholders, such as the public research organization and external financiers (see 
Figure 1). These new members were expected to bring critical external resources. Our 
findings show mixed results. The initial boards in all Norwegian spin-off cases included a 
TTO member who represented the public research organization as the main external 
stakeholder. In half of the US cases the initial board included early stage VCs as external 
stakeholders. Contrary to our expectations, there seems to be a convergence over time in the 
sense that later board members are mainly selected from the network of the professional board 
chair. This board chair came from outside the venture during the first change in board 
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composition and tended to remain in the company during all stages of growth influencing 
subsequent board additions. Therefore, we separate the first change in board from the 
subsequent changes, termed board evolution process. In five cases the chair is indeed the 
largest external stakeholder and financier: either VC or industrial partner. In the remaining six 
cases the board chair is not the largest stakeholder. The process of board evolution can thus be 
characterized as driven mainly by the social networks of the board chair. Hence, 
 
Proposition 4: In the post-startup stages the new board members will most likely be recruited 
from the board chair’s network. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has sought to explore the process of board formation and board evolution in young 
academic spin-off companies (ASOs) in Norway and the US drawing on stage-based, resource 
dependence and social network theories. Our research questions are: (1) Which board 
members do ASOs add and why in the start-up stage? (2) When, why and how do changes in 
board composition occur in the subsequent stages of growth? 
 
Due to the limited number of cases, the conclusions and policy implications should be treated 
with care. However, since little is known about board dynamics in ASOs, our investigation 
represents a useful addition to the governance and spin-off literature and may provide a 
foundation for later empirical studies. We contribute by providing greater insight into 
dynamic aspects of board formation and evolution in new technology-based entrepreneurial 
firms (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Filatotchev et al. 2006; Clarysse et al. 2007), a relatively 
unstudied area in entrepreneurship and governance research (Huse 2007; Uhlaner et al. 2007). 
Overall, our findings indicate that stage-based, resource dependence and social network 
theories are important complements, which all provide partial explanations for board change 
processes, but have to be employed in combination to better understand the phenomenon. 
 
We have shown that the process of board formation is mainly driven by the social networks of 
the founders as social network theory predicts. During the pre-startup stages the founders 
develop professional relationships with “privileged witnesses” (Vanaelst et al. 2006), i.e. 
coaches and trusted informants, who guide the founders from the research stage to legal 
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incorporation. As a result, the board at founding consists of the scientist-entrepreneurs and 
people from the scientist-entrepreneurs’ networks.  
 
Furthermore, our study has shown that the board undergoes changes as the ASO grows, and 
that these changes are closely related to overcoming critical junctures and reaching the next 
development stage. Particularly, the first change in board composition is positively related to 
gaining credibility and moving to the Proof of Viability stage, while subsequent changes most 
likely move the ASO closer to the next, Maturity stage.  New outside directors bring critical 
resources that the top management team lacks. They may thus be considered to play a value-
adding role as resource dependence theory predicts.  
 
The very first board members were found mainly through the networks of founders, 
privileged witnesses, but also the chair and investors. Contrary to our expectations, the new 
board members in post-startup stages were not recruited from the social networks of the 
largest stakeholders such as universities and venture capitalists. There seemed to be a 
convergence over time in the sense that later board members were mainly selected from the 
network of the professional board chair. This chair came from outside the venture during the 
first board change and tended to remain in the company during all stages of growth 
influencing subsequent board additions. In less than half of the cases the chair represented the 
largest external stakeholder: VC or industry partner. Thus, regardless of whether the chair 
represented a principal stakeholder or not, the process of board evolution was mainly driven 
by the social networks of the chair. The role of the board chair in ASO development may, 
therefore, be more central than what is commonly assumed and requires further investigation, 
e.g. a large-scale quantitative study that tests the generalizability of this proposition.  
 
Our study adds to academic entrepreneurship research by relating changes in boards to stages 
and dominant tasks in spin-off development (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006; 
Kazanjan 1988). We suggest that changes in board composition reflect the changing resource 
needs of the company during stages of growth. In each stage the top management team works 
on certain dominant tasks and acquires necessary additional resources through new board 
members. The members added in the first rounds are mostly investors and industry 
representatives helping to solve tasks related to securing financing and strategic positioning. 
The members added in later rounds are investors, professional executives and those with 
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market-specific knowledge aiding with the acquisition of other resources, organization and 
administration, and sales and marketing.  
 
Finally, we contribute to research on boards by showing that the board is a dynamic concept 
(Uhlaner et al. 2007). As mentioned, board member additions seem to be associated with the 
venture’s progress from one stage to another. This may imply that tenure heterogeneity which 
arises from additions to the board may be beneficial to the firm. Borrowing a categorization of 
stages of development from earlier ASO studies (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006), we 
find that board member additions are closely related to events such as external capital 
increase. Future research may attempt to use a more refined categorization of stages and 
milestones borrowing e.g. from finance and governance literature. For example, one could 
trace to what extent and how the changes in board composition are related to achieving 
important entrepreneurial milestones like going public (Shane and Stuart 2002; Filatotchev et 
al. 2006). More research remains to be done examining in detail to what extent and how board 
member departures influence the firm’s development. 
 
Our research has a number of implications. Changes in the board may be seen both as an 
effect of ASOs’ development and progress to a new stage, and as a driving force in this 
development. More longitudinal research is needed, but our data point to the latter effect and 
the role of key outside directors in overcoming critical junctures. An important policy 
message is therefore to include the perspective of board dynamics in mechanisms intended to 
support ASO development. For instance, certain types of public funding seeking to stimulate 
academic entrepreneurship could be made contingent on the ability to attract professional 
outside directors to the board of an ASO. 
 
The next important policy message stems from our evidence regarding the TTOs’ 
involvement in and contribution to ASOs. Compared to well-established US TTOs whose 
involvement was basically limited to developing patenting and licensing agreements, we 
found that young TTOs in Norway played a much more active role in ASOs. They were 
represented on the ASO board and in some cases the management team, picking new board 
members and participating in other strategic decisions. Despite this active involvement during 
the legal incorporation and early post-startup period, the Norwegian spin-offs seemed to have 
a slower rate of development in post-startup stages.  
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The reason for the Norwegian TTOs’ active participation may be due to their aims to secure a 
future income for themselves and their universities and to demonstrate the legitimacy and 
importance of technology transfer and ASOs – following recent legislative changes that some 
academics did not welcome. There may thus be a conflict of interest for the TTO staff as 
representatives of the university (Mosey & Wright 2007), since involving outsiders may 
reduce their role and potential income. Public ASO support programs and seed capital funds, 
which exist in Norway and most other countries interested in stimulating academic 
entrepreneurship, should be aware of this and moderate the financial expectations to TTOs.  
 
Until recently, the legal establishment of a spin-off company was regarded as a significant 
event for Norwegian TTOs, and they received extra funding for this. The pitfall here is 
therefore also related to premature formal establishment of an ASO before all necessary 
resources and capabilities have been acquired and developed. Public support mechanisms 
should be tailored so that they could prevent the premature formal establishment of an ASO. 
As shown in our data, after such early legal start-up some scientist-entrepreneurs were 
frustrated by a lack of progress. So, attracting the first key outside directors who were also the 
main resource providers was experienced as an “actual” start-up enabling the ASO to develop 
the business further. The challenge for TTOs is, in other words, to find a balance between 
acting as a representative of the university and as a wider societal institution. 
 
For policy-makers and practitioners we suggest that there may be a need to develop policies 
that meet the needs of ASOs in finding outside directors. Efforts to develop networks and 
relationships with professional board members – investors, industrial members, and 
executives – may be an important additional component in general and specific assistance 
programs. This may imply that TTOs should recruit staff with working experience in private 
high-tech sectors in established companies, not only in start-ups.  Such actions may help 
address the concerns that academic spin-offs are being created without the necessary 
resources to move the business forward.    
 
Our study has a number of limitations which will hopefully be addressed by future research. 
One limitation is methodological. We have conducted one or two interviews per firm using a 
limited number of cases. Overall, we attempted to address this limitation by studying cases 
that are in different stages of development, to better capture the evolutionary aspects of board 
composition. Future research might undertake longitudinal studies of a greater number of 
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cases to trace the board evolution of firms through development stages.  Next, additions and 
departures raise important governance issues in terms of how changes in the equity holdings 
are negotiated. We have been able to observe the effects of additions on firm development. 
Further research may explore departures, negotiation and tension issues, and examine whether 
the changes are conflict-loaded or resolved by the power that may come from the size of an 
individual’s equity holding.   
 
In spite of these limitations, we have attempted in this study to shed light on an unstudied 
topic, namely board formation and evolution of board composition in new technology-based 
firms, going beyond agency perspective. Our results indicate that the process of board 
formation is driven by the social networks of the founders, while the process of board 
evolution is mainly driven by social networks of the board chair with external board members 
adding value by bringing the additional resources that the management team lacks and, thus, 
contributing to the development of the venture.       
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